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Within the last few months, the so-called “subprime mortgage 
crisis” has developed from a small blip on the economic radar 
screen to a situation that has threatened financial markets 
and financial institutions worldwide. This financial instability 
induced the Federal Reserve to announce a historically large 
75 basis point decline in the federal funds rate on January 22, 
2008. Financial experts and economists are suddenly talking of 
a U.S. recession in 2008, and the only question is how deep the 
depressing effects will be. There is even the possibility of a global 
recession. This recessionary threat has led the White House 
and Congress to announce a fiscal stimulus package consisting 
primarily of a one-time tax rebate of between $300 to $1200 
for families within defined income limits, plus a temporary 
tax reduction for business making certain investments in 
2008. This stimulus plan is surely too little and too late. 
Just a little over a month ago, many of the “best and the 
brightest” economic experts were not in favor of any fiscal 
stimulus package. The Wall Street Journal reported that former 
Federal Reserve Chair Alan Greenspan recommended that 
politicians do nothing to prevent a possible recession as a result 
of the subprime mortgage lending mess.1  Greenspan preferred 
to let the market solve the problem by “letting housing prices 
(and security pegged to mortgages) fall until investors see them 
as bargains and start buying, stabilizing the economy.” But 
if Congress does nothing, then a year from today we may be 
mired in the Greatest Recession since the Great Depression.
The  proposed stimulus package will bring forth some 
additional household and business spending. Nevertheless, 
perhaps as much as 20 percent of each dollar of household 
tax rebate will go to buy cheap foreign imported goods, 
and therefore will not stimulate demand for American 
produced goods. Another 20 to 30 percent of household 
rebates may go into reducing household credit card or 
other debts, or directly into savings accounts. Accordingly, 
perhaps as little as fifty cents on the dollar will stimulate 
the economy. Not much stimulus bang for the buck! 
The temporary tax cuts for businesses may not stimulate 
much additional investment as long as domestic market 
demand remains slack. Moreover, since the business tax relief 
is temporary, it encourages moving investments that may 
already be scheduled for next year into today’s tax reduction 
period, thus creating a potential further decline in demand 
after the tax relief expires. In sum, any temporary fiscal 
stimulus package is likely to have temporary, and small if any, 
positive effects to offset the forthcoming recession in 2008.
As I will discuss below, the original subprime mess has 
ultimately resulted in an insolvency problem for millions of 
U.S. households. The government’s fiscal “stimulus” plan 
does not directly address this insolvency problem. The Fed-
eral Reserve pumping in more liquidity will not end the 
housing insolvency problem. Instead, I suggest a tried and 
true comprehensive program to create a major federal facil-
ity to refinance mortgages at low rates and extended maturi-
ties, and to finance new investment in private sector hous-
ing. The goal of this new lending facility will be to: 1) end 
the insolvency housing problem; 2) avoid a serious recession, 
and; 3) prevent similar financial bubbles due to securitization 
of loan-backed financial assets from developing in the future. 
BANK SOLVENCY CRISES
A sage once said “Those who cannot remember the past are 
condemned to repeat its errors.” So let’s look at what history 
can teach us about what “caused” this housing bubble and how 
we can relieve the distress. After U.S. Stock Market Crash of 
October 1929, one out of every five banks in the U.S. failed. 
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Several years after the Crash and the beginning of The Great 
Depression of the 1930s, a U.S. Senate committee held 
hearings on the possible causes of the Crash. These hearings 
indicated that in the early part of the 20th century individual 
investors were seriously hurt by banks whose self-interest lay 
in promoting sales of securities that benefited only the banks. 
The hearings concluded that a major cause of the Crash 
was that banks, in the 1920s, significantly increased their 
underwriting activities of securities. Consequently, in 1933, 
Congress passed the Glass-Steagall Act, which banned banks 
from underwriting securities. Financial institutions had to 
choose either to be a simple bank lender or an underwriter 
(investment banker or brokerage firm). The Act also gave 
the Federal Reserve more control over banking activities.
As a result, for several decades bank originated mortgage loans 
were not resalable. The originating bank lender knew that he or 
she would have to carry the mortgage loan debt security over its 
life. If the borrower defaulted, the lender would bear the costs 
of foreclosure. Thus, the originating bank lender thoroughly 
investigated the three C’s of each borrower—Collateral, Credit 
History, and Character—before making a mortgage loan.
In the 1970s, deregulation of U.S. banking activities 
began when brokerage firms began offering money market, 
high interest, check writing accounts that competed with 
traditional banking business. In the 1980s the Federal Reserve 
reinterpreted the Glass-Steagall Act to allow banks to engage in 
securities underwriting activities to a small extent.  In 1987 the 
Fed Board allowed banks to handle significant underwriting 
activities including those of mortgage-backed securities, despite 
objections of Fed Chairman Paul Volker. When Alan Greenspan 
became chair of the Fed in 1987, he favored further bank 
deregulation to help U.S. banks compete with foreign banks, 
where the latter are often universal banks which are permitted 
to act as investment banks, take equity stakes, and the like. 
In 1996, the Federal Reserve permitted bank holding com-
panies to own investment banking affiliates that could contrib-
ute up to 25 percent of total revenue of the holding company. 
In 1999, after 12 attempts in 25 years, Congress (with the 
support of President Clinton) repealed the Glass-Steagall Act. 
In a 1999 article in The Wall Street Journal (a few days before 
Congress repealed the Act), Republican Senator Phil Gramm 
is quoted as telling a Citigroup lobbyist to “get [Citigroup Co-
Chairman] Sandy Weill on the phone right now. Tell him to 
call the White House and get [them] moving.”2  Soon after 
Gramm’s warning, President Clinton supported the repeal of 
the Glass-Steagall. Shortly after Congress repealed the Act, Sec-
retary of Treasury Robert Rubin accepted a top job at Citigroup.
HOUSING MARKET CRISES IN HISTORY
Once Glass-Steagall was repealed, there were no legal 
constraints between loan origination and underwriting 
activities. Accordingly, there is a great profit incentive for a 
mortgage originator to search out any potential home buyers 
(including sub prime ones) and provide them with a mortgage. 
The originator can then profitably sell these mortgages, usually 
within 30 days, to an underwriter, or act as an underwriter 
to sell to the public exotic mortgage-backed securities. The 
originator therefore has no fear of default if the borrower 
can at least make his first monthly mortgage payment.
The underwriter typically packages these mortgages into 
collateral debt obligations (CDOs), Structured Investment 
Vehicles (SIVs), or other esoteric financial vehicles. He then 
sells tranches in these vehicles to unwary pension funds, local 
and state revenue funds, individual investors, or other banks 
domestically or overseas (e.g., Northern Rock in the UK) who, 
led on by the high ratings of these complex financial securities by 
rating agencies, believe these are safe investment vehicles. Thus, 
since the turn of the century, this process of packaging and selling 
mortgage-backed securities has helped finance the housing 
bubble that pushed housing prices to historic highs by 2005. 
In a December 14, 2007 article, New York Times op-ed 
writer Paul Krugman defined the resulting housing bubble 
as where the price of housing exceeded a “normal ratio” 
relative to rents or incomes.3  Like Greenspan, Krugman 
does not suggest anything that politicians can do to relieve 
the distress caused by the deflating housing bubble. Krugman 
believes the market will solve the problem by deflating house 
prices. He estimates that housing prices will have to fall by 30 
percent to restore a “normal ratio.” This implies that home 
values in the U.S. will decline by some six trillion dollars. 
The result will be that many borrowers “will find themselves 
with negative equity” as their outstanding mortgage exceeds 
this “normal” market price of the borrower’s house—an 
insolvency problem. Krugman indicates that no one can 
provide a quick fix for this problem; he suggests that it will “take 
years” for the market to clean up the insolvency housing mess.
In many states mortgages are non-recourse loans (i.e., 
after default and foreclosure the borrower is not responsible 
for the difference between the outstanding mortgage bal-
ance and the lower sale price at foreclosure). If Krugman’s 30 
percent house value decline is accurate, as many as 10 mil-
lion households will end up with negative equity and will 
have a strong incentive to default. Millions of homeown-
ers will lose their homes in foreclosure proceedings and in-
vestors in mortgage-backed securities will incur large losses. 
THE HOLC
But a study of history can give us clues as to how to solve 
the problem. The Roosevelt Administration’s handling of the 
housing insolvency crisis of the 1930s suggests a precedent 
for dealing with the U.S. housing bubble distress. In 1933, 
the Home Owners Refinancing Act created the Home 
Owners’ Loan Corporation (HOLC) to refinance homes to 
prevent foreclosures, and also to bail out mortgage holding 
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banks. The HOLC was a tremendous success, making one 
million low-interest loans which often extended the pay-off 
period of the original loan, thereby significantly reducing 
the monthly payments to amounts that homeowners 
could afford. In its years of operation, the HOLC not 
only paid all its bills, but it also made a small profit. 
Other measures might include setting up a government 
agency to take non-performing mortgage loans off the books 
of private balance sheets and therefore remove the threat of 
insolvency for those who took positions in the mortgage-
backed securities after being misled by rating agencies. The 
result will prevent further sell-offs causing financial distress 
in all financial markets. The Resolution Trust Corporation, 
set up by the government, did remove non-performing 
mortgage loans from Building Societies’ balance sheets after 
the 1980s Savings and Loan bank crisis, thereby preventing 
further financial damage to others. Also, Congress might 
consider a 21st Century version of the 1930s government-
sponsored Reconstruction Finance Corporation to help 
finance investments and operations in the private sector 
housing and related industries during this insolvency crisis.
Congress should act promptly to create the necessary 
government agencies to help clean up this mess rather than 
wait out the “years” that Krugman suggests it would take if we 
leave the solution to the market. Moreover, the Greenspan-
Krugman market solution will cause collateral damage to 
many innocent economic casualties (e.g., homeowners in 
neighborhoods where foreclosures are prevalent, and workers 
and business firms in construction and related industries). 
While we wait for Congress to act on this proposed pro-
gram, it may be desirable for the Federal government to start 
up an infrastructure rebuilding program to help stimulate the 
economy out of a potential forthcoming recession and in-
crease productivity in the longer run. There is sufficient evi-
dence that more than 50 percent of U.S. bridges and other 
public structures are in a weakened or failing condition. What 
better way to offset a possible recession in the construction 
industry and at the same time contribute to improvements 
in our nation’s transportation productivity? Every dollar 
spent on rebuilding and improving infrastructure will create 
jobs for U.S. workers and profits for domestic enterprises.
RESPONSE TO POTENTIAL NAY-SAYERS
There will be those who say that this proposed solution to 
the housing bubble problem will be too costly. Moreover, they 
will question why U.S. taxpayers should bail out banks, other 
financial institutions, individual investors, and individual 
subprime borrowers who made foolish decisions. To help these 
institutions and individuals will merely introduce the “moral 
hazard” problem: protecting individuals and institutions 
from economic losses they would otherwise suffer due to 
their previous foolish decisions will only encourage them 
(and other fools) to make more risky decisions in the future 
since, if their actions result in large economic losses, they 
believe the government will step in to bail them out. What is 
the proper response to nay-sayers who raise these arguments?
First, the real cost of a serious recession in 2008 is very 
large if we do nothing but hope that the Federal Reserve 
continues to lower the interest rate that they charge banks. 
The above proposal assures that, at worst, a mild slow down 
will occur in 2008, and more likely the U.S. economy will 
experience substantial economic growth while rebuilding 
productive infrastructure. Clearly these benefits exceed the 
potential real costs of a recession that could last several years.
Second, this proposal avoids the significant collateral 
economic damage to many innocent bystanders that will 
occur if we rely on the market to reduce home prices by 
30 percent. These innocent bystanders include: 1) existing 
homeowners, especially in areas where there are large number 
of neighborhood foreclosures; 2) potential home buyers who 
have deposits on unfinished homes where builders file for 
bankruptcy (The New York Times recently featured a front-page 
article about this regarding Levitt Builders in the Carolinas4 
); 3) unemployed workers and businesses in the building and 
home furnishing industries; 4) local governments that put 
their revenues into CDOs thinking that their money was in 
a safe investment, and; 5) some pensioners who might find 
their annual pension income declining as the pension fund 
takes a loss on its investment in mortgage-backed assets.
If this proposal is adopted, which banks will be bailed 
out? Probably very few banks, except the large ones who 
have combined normal banking affiliates with investment 
banking underwriting subsidiaries under the banking holding 
company cloak (e.g., Citigroup). There are news reports that 
upon occasion these big institutions provided some “liquidity 
puts”( i.e., promised to buy back some tranches of their 
asset-backed packages), which means that if financial stress 
occurs, these banks’ off-balance sheet liabilities might have 
to be moved back to on-balance sheet of the bank and/or its 
underwriting affiliate. That partly explains the big write-offs 
of Morgan Stanley, Merrill Lynch, etc. But these big bank 
institutions are “too big to fail” anyway, so some bailout must 
be arranged. Small regional banks often are not big enough 
to engage in significant underwriting activities. If, however, 
they did create mortgage-backed assets that they sold to 
the public, then the liability of default has probably already 
been passed off without any “liquidity put” guarantees.
The last refuge of those who argue against bailout is the 
“moral hazard” argument. But if Congress passes a 21st Century 
equivalent of the Glass-Steagall Act, which prohibits making 
bank loans resalable, then we will have legally prevented those 
who have been bailed out from again originating risky loans 
that they can push off their balance sheets within a month or so. 
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History also tells us that the distress to U.S. taxpayers 
for extensive bail-out programs is not significant. Did most 
taxpayers notice any significant cost of resolving the S&L 
crisis, despite the media’s constant argument that taxpayers 
would suffer? Did individual and corporate income tax 
rates increase as a direct result of the S&L problem?
THE FALLACY OF THE TAXPAYER COST QUESTION
The question of taxpayer costs for bailouts of financial 
institutions is typically part of discussions by the mass media. 
The question “what is it going to cost the U.S. taxpayer?” 
reflects an unthinking bias against active government policies 
to prevent recession and depression. Asking how much 
an active government policy to prevent a financial market 
calamity is going to cost the taxpayer can only be based on 
an economic theory that assumes that the macroeconomic 
activity in the economy will be unchanged whether or not 
the government takes any positive action to remove distress in 
financial markets. In other words, underlying this question is 
the micro theory ceteris paribus assumption—where the ceteris 
paribus is that the nation’s GDP will, in the long run, follow an 
unchanging long-run permanent full employment trend line.
Accordingly, if there is a recession due to some financial 
distress, it is conceived as representing an X percent fall below 
this trend line for a period of time before some automatic market 
mechanism restores the economy to the predetermined full 
employment trend line. If, on the other hand, the government 
takes some positive policy action to resolve the housing 
insolvency finance problem, then, it is presumed, there must be 
a Y percent taxpayer cost deduction from the trend line. When 
the problem is framed in this rhetoric, then it appears obvious 
that one should compare the magnitudes of X percent vis-à-vis 
Y percent reduction from the trend line. If Y percent is greater 
than X percent, then no government action should be taken. 
Since the cost of a forthcoming recession cannot 
be accurately predicted except after the fact, while one 
can always make some estimate of the cost of operating 
a government program, it should be obvious that the 
government plan can always be painted as larger than the cost 
of a mild recession. Consequently, the rhetoric of this cost to 
taxpayer question will almost always favor the “do nothing” 
argument, because it assumes that the economy has some 
automatic market mechanism that assures that the GDP will 
always quickly return to a full employment level of GDP.
 In the real world, however, there is no predetermined, long-
run GDP full employment trend line. The macroeconomic 
performance of the U.S. economy will be substantially 
improved in both the short- and long-run if the government 
takes direct action. If, on the other hand, the government leaves 
it to the market to solve the problem, the result will be an 
economic recession that might even collapse into a depression. 
Consequently, the income of American taxpayers will, on 
average, be significantly improved if government takes action 
than if we rely on the market to solve such problems. If the 
government does nothing, U.S. residents stand to experience a 
severe reduction to their income levels. Accordingly, a properly 
designed policy to avoid financial and economic depression 
provides only benefits—not costs—to the nation’s economy.
Let us look at a historical example where if this type of 
“what will cost to the tax payer and/or the economy?” question 
were asked, one of the most desirable government policies 
would never have been undertaken. At the Bretton Woods 
conference it was recognized that the European nations would 
need significant aid to help rebuild their economies after the 
war. Keynes estimated that the need would be between $12 and 
$15 billion. U.S. representative Harry Dexter White indicated 
that Congress could not ask the taxpayers to provide more 
than $3 billion. Accordingly, the Keynes Plan was defeated at 
Bretton Woods, and the Dexter White proposals were adopted
Suppose that in 1946 it was recommended that U.S. give a 
gift of $13 billion dollars over four years to various European 
countries to help them rebuild their war-ravaged economies 
(in 1940s current dollars, this sum would be well over $150 
billion in 2007 dollars). Obviously if Dexter White was 
correct, the Congress would never have approved the Marshall 
Plan. Since the Marshall Plan did not reveal in advance that 
it would provide foreign governments $13 billion over a 
period of four years, Congress approved the Marshall Pan. The 
Marshall Plan gave foreign nations approximately two percent 
of the United States’ GDP each year for four years. Was the 
Marshall Plan costly to U.S. taxpayers and the U.S. economy?
The statistics indicate that, during the Marshall Plan 
years, for the first time in history the U.S. did not experience 
a serious economic slowdown immediately after a war. And 
this despite the fact that federal government expenditures 
on goods and services declined by approximately 57 
percent between 1945 and 1946. Furthermore, four years 
after World War II, federal government expenditure was 
still approximately half of what it had been in 1945. 
When the U.S. emerged from World War II, the federal debt 
was more than 100 percent of the GDP. Accordingly, there was 
great political pressure to reign in federal government spending 
to make sure that the federal debt did not grow substantially. 
Clearly, then, it was not “Keynesian” deficit spending that kept the 
U.S. out of recession in the immediate post-World War II years.
What was the cost of the Marshall Plan to the U.S. 
economy and the U.S. taxpayer? In 1946, the GDP per 
capita was 25 percent higher than it had been in the last 
peace years before the War. GDP per capita continued 
to grow during the Marshall Plan years. Despite giving 
away two percent of U.S. GDP, American residents (and 
taxpayers) experienced a higher standard of living each year. 
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Clearly The Marshall Plan did not make American taxpayers 
feel they were bearing a great cost in terms of real income.
The Marshall Plan was good for the European nations since 
the Europeans used the funds to buy U.S. exports needed to 
feed its population and rebuild it war damaged capital stock. 
In the United States, unemployment was not a problem 
despite nine million men and women being released from 
the Armed Services into the civilian population and labor 
force. The Marshall Plan financed a significant growth in U.S. 
exports that help offset, in part, the fall in aggregate demand 
due to a reduction in government spending. U.S. export 
growth was not the only offset as pent up consumer demand 
also expanded in the post-war period. Without the Marshall 
Plan, however, the U.S. export industries would not have 
expanded, and probably would have declined, as European 
nations exhausted whatever foreign reserves they possessed.
In sum, were there any real costs of the Marshall Plan as 
compared to doing nothing? A response that Americans were 
forced to reduce their living standards by approximately two 
percent would only be correct if one assumed that the GDP 
would have been the same in those early post-war years 
without the Marshall Plan. Can anyone really believe this?
THE ACCOUNTING COSTS OF INSTITUTIONS SUCH AS 
HOLC AND RTC
It has already been indicated that the HOLC actually earned 
a small profit over its life. From 1933 to 1935, the HOLC 
provided almost $3 billion in bonds to banks in exchange for 
mortgages, thereby reducing the pressure of potential economic 
failure for many banks. Moreover, if it were not for the HOLC 
more houses would have been foreclosed. The economic misery 
of the depression would have been worse. More Americans 
would have been living in the street (or Hoovervilles), 
while the U.S. housing stock would have depreciated much 
more rapidly due to the neglect of vacant foreclosed homes.
The HOLC financed all of its operations through either 
earnings or borrowing. Congress never appropriated any 
funds for the HOLC. [Notice this made the operations of 
HOLC an off-balance sheet operation.] The original act 
called for the HOLC to issue its own bonds with the interest 
guaranteed by the U.S. Treasury and with a maturity not to 
exceed 18 years. A year later the guarantee by the Treasury was 
extended to the principal as well. Although HOLC initially 
issued its bonds to the public, eventually the HOLC received 
its funds by borrowing directly from the Treasury rather 
than from the money markets. From 1936 to 1940, HOLC 
borrowed $875 million directly from the U.S. Treasury. 
The RTC was a corporation formed by Congress in 
1989 to replace the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance 
Corporation and to respond to the insolvency of about 750 
savings and loan associations. As receiver, it sold assets of 
failed S&Ls and paid insured depositors. In 1995 its duties, 
including insurance of deposit in thrift institutions, were 
transferred to the Savings Association Insurance Fund. 
The S&L crisis in 1989 occurred under a Republican 
Administration that had pledged “no new taxes.” Nevertheless, 
the Administration recognized the difficulty of the problem 
involving the large number of S&L insolvencies, and it supported 
the formation of the RTC. The first Bush administration 
recognized, apparently, that the RTC would not require new 
taxes to burden the U.S. taxpayer with the cost of the program.
After much wrangling by Congress, the initial funding 
of the RTC included $18.8 billion from the Treasury 
and $31.2 billion from bonds issued by the RTC (and 
therefore an-off budget liability). In 1995, the RTC was 
folded into another larger government agency, and there 
has been no public accounting records provided to show 
whether the RTC operations ultimately made a profit or not.
In sum, although there are some accounting costs 
of setting up any institution similar to the HOLC 
and the RTC, these bookkeeping entries are unlikely 
to hurt U.S. taxpayers. The benefits from having such 
institutions alleviating economic distress far outweigh 
the costs of allowing deflationary market forces solve the 
problem of our bursting housing and financial bubble.
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